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Judicial Notice of Foreign Law
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental cleavage exists between the two methods of viewing
judicial notice. Both views must be understood before the doctrine
of judicial notice can be said to have a real meaning applicable
to the whole variety of legal problems which arise today. This
understanding must be achieved before many of the seeming inconsistencies in what has been written about the doctrine can be
clarified. Finally, this basic understanding must be had if any
comprehension of the operation of judicial notice in any specific field
of law is possible.
This discussion will deal primarily with judicial notice of foreign
law. Around this base, several tangential subjects will be developed.
First and foremost, a rather detailed development of the doctrine of
judicial notice will be presented in an attempt to achieve the requisite
basic understanding. Secondly, some consideration will be given to
the use of judicial notice in specific areas apart from that of foreign
law. Finally, some discussion of the use of foreign law generally,
other than the taking of judicial notice thereof, is essential. This will
be accomplished by examining the primary means by which foreign
law is introduced in a trial: The proof of foreign law and the presumption of similarity which the court of the forum will indulge in
with respect to the law of a foreign state.
II. JuDicLL NoTIcE: WHAT Is IT?
Professor Wigmore highlights the "anamolous meanings of the
term Judicial notice" and details the usages thereof, both traditional
and common.' This variety of usages has no special relevance here,
except to illustrate the looseness with which the doctrine of judicial
notice is often treated. The important conflict occurs with respect
to the different theories as to the nature and effect of judicial notice.
A. Two Views-The Conflict
1. Wigmore's Theory.-Professor Wigmore advances the thesis that
the effect of judicial notice is its non-conclusiveness on the matter
in dispute. Reasoning from nature to effect, his argument is basically
2
that judicial notice is nothing more than the concept that a "matter"
1. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2566 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMorIE].
2. There is little point at this stage in the discussion of becoming entangled by

using the concepts of "facts" or "law." The differences between the various "matters"
of which judicial notice may be taken will be evaluated at an appropriate time in
the development of the subject of judicial notice.
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is taken as true without adhering to the usual formal requirements
of proof. Therefore, one's "opponent is not prevented from disputing
the matter by evidence, if he believes it disputable." 3 These conclusions flow easily, of course, from the underlying conception of
"judicial notice [as] an expedient for hastening the trial and eliminating superfluities."
This viewpoint virtually labels judicial notice as a presumption,
with the matter which is so noted being subject to rebuttal in every
case. The view is supported by a number of scholars in the field of
evidence.5 Professor Thayer, in his excellent discussion of the development of judicial notice, concluded that it does
not necessarily [grant] anything more than a prima facie recognition, leaving
the matter still open to controversy. [In very many cases, then, taking
judicial notice of a fact is merely6 presuming it, i.e., assuming it until there
shall be reason to think otherwise.

Carrying this conception of judicial notice to its logical conclusion,
should a court notice that Missouri is east of the Rocky Mountains,
a party may yet attempt to prove that the State is indeed west of
the Rocky Mountains, if he believes it to be disputable. Whether this

belief need be reasonable would require a further refining of the
theory which, at this point, would not be profitable. The important
point is that this view of judicial notice does not give the doctrine a
very great important in defining matters essential to the litigation.
2. Morgan's Theory.-Professor Morgan, on the other hand, sets
forth a substantially different nature-effect conception of judicial
notice:
Just as the court cannot function unless the judge knows the law and unless
the judge and jury have the fund of information common to all intelligent
men in the community as well as the capacity to use the ordinary processes
of reasoning, so it cannot adjust legal relations among members of society
and thus fulfill the sole purpose of its creation if it permits the parties to
take issue on, and thus secure results contrary to, what is so notoriously true
as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute, or what is capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to sources of indisputable
accuracy easily accessible to men in the situation of members of the court.
This, it is submitted, 7is the rocl of reason and policy upon which judicial
notice of facts is built.
3. 9 WIGooRE § 2567, at 535.
4. Id. at 536.
5. Among these are: THAYER, EvmnmrcE AT THE COMMON LAw 277-312 (1898)
[hereinafter cited as THAym]; TRAcY, EviDENcE 44-54 (1952).
6. THAYER 308-09.
7. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HAIv. L. REv. 269, 273-74 (1944) [hereinafter cited
as Morgan, 57 ILuAv. L. lEv.]. While this basis for judicial notice is attributed here
by Professor Morgan only to facts, the reasoning inherent in his analysis will be
developed later to show that it applies to facts as well.
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This concept involves several integral parts. 8 The first of these is
that the sole purpose of a judicial system is the adjustment of legal
relations. This being so, that system must use all reasonable efforts
to arrive at such an adjustment without allowing unnecessary controversy. When the probability of a matter is so great as to make the
truth of the proposition notoriously indisputable among reasonable
men, or when its existence is capable of accurate demonstration,
judicial notice of that matter must be taken. The fact that the
trial may be expedited by the use of judicial notice-the foundation
stone on which Professor Wigmore's theory of judicial notice is constructed-is irrelevant to this concept of judicial notice. It is, of
course, an advantageous by-product when its presence is felt; it
should not, however, be its raison d'tre.9
At this point the' "mechanical" aspects of Professor Morgan's
theory of judicial notice should be spelled out. A matter which is
judicially noticeable does not simply appear to the court as "revealed
truth." Actions of the parties to a lawsuit and by the judge are
required to determine whether a matter is to be judicially noticed.
It is proper for a judge to take judicial notice of a matter on his
own. Should he do so, however, he should notify the parties of this
fact, as well as the reasons for which he is taking judicial notice.
A challenge to such action should even be allowed, for, in no case,
can the judge be allowed to take judicial notice of a factual matter
merely because he believes the matter to be indisputable. 10
In the more likely event in which one of the parties moves for the
taking of judicial notice, that party should be allowed to present to
the judge any and all sources of information in establishing the
propriety of judicial notice. The opposing party should likewise be
given the opportunity to present information denying that the matter
sought to be judicially noticed is a proper subject for such notice.
This process should not be subject to the strict rules of evidence;
the jury should not be allowed to play any part in this determination.
The final judgment as to whether the particular matter is susceptible
of being judicially noticed should rest with the judge. The procedural
effect of taking judicial notice necessarily is to remove the matter
8. Professor Morgan has detailed these parts and examined the general problems
involved. Morgan, 57 HARv. L. REv. at 269-72.
9. It need not be true in all cases that the taking of judicial notice will expedite
the trial. The basic function of judicial notice is to keep the jury from the necessity
of reaching a determination on a matter which cannot reasonably be disputed. The
fact that this will generally speed up the conduct of the trial should not be used as
the major basis for the doctrine of judicial notice.
10. It has been noted, perhaps too often to warrant comment here, that the judge
must not be allowed to take judicial notice in this manner of some matter vhich,
because of personal knowledge, he believes to be indisputable.
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from dispute in the lawsuit. If judicial notice is not taken, the
matter remains one subject to proof, with the trier of fact then
being required to make its usual factual determination on the
matter."
Three discernible gradations in Professor Morgan's view demand
examination. These concern the types of propositions which may
be judicially noticed and the proof required as a condition to their
being noticed. A matter which the judge knows only of his own
personal knowledge is not properly subject to judicial notice. For
example, in a tort action arising out of an automobile accident which
occurred somewhat coincidentally on the judge's street, the fact that
the judge knows that the street is two lanes wide (or does or does
not allow parking and so on) is not properly subject to being judicially
noticed without proof by one party that such is the case and should
be judicially noticed.
The second type of proposition concerns a fact that is known in
only a specific or limited area, but, within that area, is generally
known. Such a fact-known to virtually every Tennessean-is that
the Grand Old Opry originates live every Saturday night in Nashville. This fact may not be known to a court in Pennsylvania, for
example, but, under Professor Morgan's theory of judicial notice,
the fact could properly be judicially noticed, as it is capable of
accurate demonstration. Such a fact in a Tennessee court is, of course,
subject to being judicially noticed on the court's own motion.
Thirdly, there are propositions of general or universal knowledge
such as the fact that an object, when released from a height, will fall.
This type of fact, as will be explained later, is one which is intuitively
known.
3. A Possible Resolution.-An overly simple explanation of the
difference between the views of Professors Morgan and Wigmore
would note that both views involve the taking of proof, but in different
manners. Professor Wigmore's view allows proof to be presented
challenging a matter which has already been judicially noticednoticed, that is, at a time when it appeared indisputable. This proof is,
of course, to the jury; the effect of taking judicial notice has been
eliminated, because one of the parties believed the matter to be
disputable.
Professor Morgan, on the other hand, requires that the proof be
presented to the court which, in turn, determines, on the basis of
such proof, whether the matter in question should be judicially
noticed at all. Once the matter has been noticed, it becomes indisputable; the jury plays no part in this determination.
11. This development is from Morgan, 57 HARv. L. REv. at 286-87.
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This, it is submitted, is the fundamental difference in these two
theories. It is further submitted here that the proper interpretation
to be put on judicial notice is that advanced by Professor Morgan.
Before the doctrine may be used the fundamental concepts outlined
earlier must be kept in mind. Once these are firmly grasped, the
logic of granting a conclusive nature to a matter judicially noticed
becomes plain. Against this backdrop, it is possible to review the
specific areas in which judicial notice can be used.
B. Two Areas of Application
A lawsuit is society's method for adjusting legal relationships
between members of that society. Achieving such an adjustment is
the basic function of the courts. Every lawsuit necessarily has a
fact situation and an applicable legal theory. In this context, the
12
fact situation initially is the most important part of the lawsuit.
1. Judicial Notice of Fact.-This is the first stage at which judicial
notice becomes relevant at trial. The basic question is whether any
facts may be judicially noticed. In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, for example, the existence of state remedies, the exhaustion of
which is normally a prerequisite for federal action, is a major fact
in issue. One federal district judge recently faced with the problem
of whether petitioner had exhausted his state remedies held that
this court will take judicial notice of the fact that at the Michigan State
Judicial Conference in August of 1964, a seminar was held with the Supreme
Court Justices and the State trial judges present, at which time the impact

of the new Constitution and the recent United States Supreme Court decisions ... were discussed. 13

In denying the petition, the judge was influenced by the fact, of
which he took judicial notice, that state remedies existed which the
petitioner had not exhausted. In Professor Morgan's terminology,
such a fact is one "capable of immediate and accurate demonstration
by resort to sources of indisputable accuracy easily accessible to men
in the situation of members of the court." 4 Here, anyone in the
situation of the parties concerned in the instant action could readily
demonstrate the fact of this expansion of state remedies.
A fact of the type "so notoriously true as not to be the subject of
reasonable dispute" 5 is of the following nature: "We take judicial
12. If, of course, no legal theory is applicable, the best factual situation is for
naught. Thus, a wife with a tort claim against her husband at the common law could
not, regardless of the factual validity of such a claim, legally enforce the claim.
13. Herron v. Birzgalis, 235 F. Supp. 982, 983 (W.D. Mich. 1964).

14. Morgan, 57 H-Amv. L. REv. at 273.
15. Ibid.

19651

NOTES

1967

notice of the fact that the Legislature in its statutes sometimes uses
terms and phrases that may leave the individuals involved perplexed
as to the meaning of such terms." 16 Intuitively, reasonable men
cannot question the fact that statutes are often vague; in fact, one
of the functions of the court is to clarify this vagueness.
The basic difference in these two types of facts revolves around
this intuitive aspect. The first is a fact not intuitively known; yet,
this type of fact-e.g., that "January 6, 1963, which this court judicially
knows was on Sunday"-' 7 is demonstrable by resort to a source of
indisputable accuracy-in this case, a calendar. The second is the type
of fact which is intuitively known. Thus, in an action attacking the
constitutionality of a price-fixing law for milk, the Maine court
intuitively knew "that the milk industry is one of the important
industries in this state; that it is a food absolutely essential to the
health of practically every individual in this state; that it is the
primary diet of babies .... ."18 Both of these types of facts are equally
susceptible of being judicially noticed.
No dispute exists as to a court's power, in a proper case, to take
judicial notice. Actually, the right of the court to take such notice is
inherent in the power of the court. "The maxim that what is known
need not be proved . . . may be traced far back in the civil and
the canon law; indeed it is probably coeval with legal procedure
itself."19
2. Judicial Notice of Law.-If the fact situation has been established, the second important matter at trial concerns the applicable
legal theory; here, judicial notice of domestic law becomes important.
According to Professor Morgan "the trial judge must take judicial
notice of the domestic law of the jurisdiction of which he is a judicial
officer." 20 "The judicial office in our system cannot be rationally
administered on any other premise."2 1
Professor Wigmore reaches a similar conclusion, but immediately
introduces a gradation of cases to which Professor Morgan's canon
will apply.22 In fact, if Professor Wigmore's theory is rigidly adhered
16. Calio v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 169 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App
1964). This example is given in only a slightly tongue-in-cheek fashion.
17. Holman v. Baker, 277 Ala. 310, 169 So. 2d 429, 431 (1964).
18. Main Milk Comm. v. Cumberland Farms Northern, Inc., 205 A.2d 146, 152
(Me. 1964). Saying that "the court intuitively knew" certain facts is not the same
as saying that the court took judicial notice of a fact which "it believed to be
indisputable."
19. THAYm 277.
20. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVMENCE 1 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
21. Morgan, 57 HARv. L. REv. at 271.
22. 9 WiGmoRE § 2572. "A Court may be expected to dispense with production of
evidence of the law of its own sovereignty; for it must be credited with a knowledge
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to-if judicial notice resembles a presumption, subject to rebuttal
in any given case-the conclusion is inescapable that any party could

challenge the law which the judge finds applicable to the case.
Common sense dictates that the courts of the forum judicially know
the law of their state. Some question may arise as to precisely what

law is included, for example, whether a municipal ordinance is
law subject to being judicially known. This, however, cannot obscure

the necessity of the judge knowing the law of the state in which
he sits. While a detailed study of this subject is beyond the scope

of this article, it can be noted that such law should at least include
statutes of the state legislature and decisions of the highest court
of the state, as well as the intermediate courts of appeal.

One further point should be mentioned here. Courts of original
jurisdiction of the United States are bound to take judicial notice of

the laws of each of the states. 23 State courts, likewise, are bound to
judicially notice the laws of the federal government.24 In no sense
are the laws of one of these governments to be considered "foreign"

to the other. Problems of judicial notice of foreign law in this federalstate context arise only indirectly.
of it, or at least with competent knowledge where to search for it. No evidence of
it need therefore be offered . . . "There are, however, certain natural limitations .... "
23. "We are of opinion, that the circuit courts of the United States are created
by Congress, not for the purpose of administering the local law of a single state
alone, but to administer the laws of all the states in the Union, in cases to which
they respectively apply. The judicial power conferred on the general government,
by the constitution, extends to many cases arising under the laws of the different
states. And this court is called upon, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
constantly to take notice of and administer the jurisprudence of all the states. That
jurisprudence is, then, in no just sense, a foreign jurisprudence, to be proved in the
courts of the United States, by the ordinary modes of proof by which the laws of
a foreign country are to be established; but it is to be judicially taken notice of, in
the same manner as the laws of the United States are taken notice of by these courts."
Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 397, 409 (1835).
24. "The State courts are bound to take judicial notice of the existence of the
Federal courts; it is also supposed that they will know something of the laws of
Congress, though not generally called on to administer them." Mims v. Swartz, 37
Tex. 13 (1873). This point seems well settled; the courts which have been faced
with the question have not been troubled with citing authority to support their conclusion. "It is argued in behalf of the plaintiff that this is a traverse of fact, tho
ground of the argument being that as the states of the union are foreign to each
other, so the Federal government and each state are foreign each to the other and
that a statute of one is a fact to be pleaded and proved in the courts of the other if
there relied on. But in each state the acts of the Legislature of that state and the
acts of Congress operate alike upon every one and alike claim recognition and due
application by the courts. The public statutes of the general government are no moro
facts to be alleged and proved in the courts of a state than are the public statutes
of that state. Under our complex system there are in every state two bodies of
statutory law equally entitled to direct recognition." Metropolitan Stock Exch. v.
Lyndonville Nat'l Bank, 76 Vt. 303, 307, 57 AUt. 101, 102 (1904).
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III. JuiciIAL NOnCE. OF FO1EIGN LAW

Quite often in a trial, foreign law is determinative of the cause of
action. At this point, judicial notice of foreign law becomes important.
Some basic concepts must be enunciated to foreshadow a later discussion of the subject.
A. The Problem
The facts of modem American society make contact by each citizen
with a state other than his own practically inevitable. Whether these
contacts be for business or pleasure legal relationships arise which
need adjustment by the courts. The factual situation out of which the
suit arises probably will have occurred, at least partially, outside the
forum. The question which is inevitably posed in such cases is which
law is applicable.2 5 Must the court of the forum apply its own law
in the case merely by virtue of the fact that it is the forum state's
court which is being used?
1. How It Arises.-In a probate proceeding, the problem of determining which law will be applied to a trust created in a state other
than that in which the will is being probated is a very real one
when the laws of the states involved conflict. Florida law recognizes Totten-type trusts2 while, on the other hand, New Jersey law
does not.27 A probate court in New Jersey faces a difficult problem
when a Totten trust created in Florida by the New Jersey testator is
attacked in the probate proceedings. 28
In all its aspects, the law of Florida on this point (or, for that
matter, on any point) is law, whether an action under it is brought
in Florida or another state. To this extent, therefore, Florida law is
analogous to the law of New Jersey. The problem arises as to which
law will be used, a troublesome problem here, as the law of Florida
and New Jersey on the matter of Totten trusts is conflicting. A
sec6ndary problem is how Florida law enters the picture, should the
New Jersey court be inclined to apply it.29
25. As will be shown later, these can indeed be two separate and distinct problems.
26. "This well-known common-law doctrine has been adopted in many jurisdictions.
... We accept it without hesitation." Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla.

1956).

27. In Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq. 743, 61 AUt. 267 (1905), New Jersey had
rejected the Totten trust as an invalid testamentary disposition violative of the will
statute at virtually the same time such trusts were being sanctioned by the New York
Court of Appeals in the case which gave the trust its name. In re Totten, 179 N.Y.
112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). The question of whether Howard Say. Institute v. Kielb,
38 N.J. 186, 183 A.2d 401 (1962), affects the status of Totten trusts in New Jersey
is not essential for present purposes.
28. In re Damato, 86 N.J. Super. 107, 206 A.2d 171 (App. Div. 1065).
29. New Jersey has enacted the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:82-27 to -34 (1941).
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The various theories concerning the effect of territorial boundaries
of a state on the laws of that state, that is, whether a law of one
state can be said to exist or have any effect as law outside that state,
now come into play.30 No dispute exists as to the basic nature of the
law of a foreign state, as law, within that foreign state. The problem
arises when the forum court is faced, directly or inferentially, with
the question of the effect of foreign law within its boundaries. It
has often been said that "foreign law is dealt with by the courts as
a fact to be taken into consideration in a proper case in creating
legal relations at the forum. .

.

.since the foreign law is a fact on

which the claims of the parties depend....
While it is generally true that foreign law is treated as a fact to
be pleaded and proved, the better view accords the foreign law its
status as law, even within the forum state, subject only to the
practical difficulties of how to use this law.
What is the law of another State, or of a foreign country, is as much a

"question of law," as what is the law of our own State .... But it is said
our Courts are not presumed to know the laws of other States, or of foreign
countries. Admit it; still, can it be questioned that the court is more
competent to ascertain and understand such laws, than the jury? or that the

jury stands as much in need of instruction in respect thereto, as in respect
to our own laws? Again, it is said the existence of such laws must be
alleged and proved as facts. Admit it. But how are they to be proved.
To the court,
or to the jury? Surely to the court, because they are "questions
32
of law."

The North Carolina Court went on to demonstrate why the question of foreign law should not be left to the jury to determine. This

reasoning will be expanded later to demonstrate how it forms a
perfect basis for the forum court to take judicial notice of foreign law.
The problem is raised to indicate the difficulties which arise when
foreign law becomes important in a trial. The New Jersey court in

the case mentioned above did decide to apply Florida law;33 the

problem which must be developed here is the permissible scope of
judicial notice of foreign law in a forum court.
2. Why Use Foreign Law?-Parties seek to use foreign law in a
trial not merely because they desire to have a law other than that
of the forum applied. For whatever reason, they feel that the law of
a foreign state-a law which will favor them-should be applied to
30. STurmaBEo,
31. Id. at 175.

CoN1icr OF LAWs 1-15 (3d ed. 1963).

32. Hooper v. Moore, 5 N.C. 130, 132-33 (1857).

33. The fact that New Jersey subscribes to the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act is if no moment here, as the provisions of the Uniform Act had not been
compiled with in this case. The Uniform Act of course, will be discussed subsequently.
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the case. Naturally, they would prefer not to have to prove this
law as a fact to the jury, for such proof generally involves considerations out of proportion to the effort it should realistically take to find

and apply such law.
B. Development of a Rule
1. "Foreign" Law in England.-The statement is made that "the
laws of foreign nations and States-not being laws of the forum at all,
except by casual adoption-at the common law would not be
noticed."4 Thus, reference must be made to the common law treatment of foreign law at trial. American courts have long ascribed their
reluctance to take judicial notice of foreign law to this common law
treatment.
a. The Common Law Rule Evolves.-The common law rule undoubtedly is that the laws of other states and nations are to be
proved here by documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses,
in which case the jury is the judge of the proofs as in other questions of fact.35 The mild expression of doubt as to whether this really
was the rule at the common law is well founded.
Fremoultv. Dedire6 is the English case most often cited as deciding
that judicial notice would not be taken of foreign law. The opinion
in this case is not very specific.
Then it was contended, that these marriage articles were made in Holland,
and that by the law of Holland, such articles take place of any other debts,
wherefore they should be here construed according to the law of Holland,
where they appeared to have been made, which was said to have been held
in the case of Feaubert and Turst . . .To which it was answered, and so
ruled, that it ought to have been proved in this cause what is the law of

Holland, as in the case of Feaubert and Turst, it was proved what was the
law of France,without which proofs our courts cannot take notice of foreign
37
laws.

The court did not say that such proof had to be made to the jury.
What was done in the case of Foubert v. Turst,3 moreover, constitutes
little justification for the conclusion that foreign law can be used at
trial only if it is pleaded and proved as a fact. In that case, domiciliaries of France contracted to marry there and subsequently entered
34. 9 WicoronE § 2573, at 554. No attempt will be made here to determine precisely what the various states meant by "the common law" in their respective reception statutes.
35. Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361, 370 (1847).
36. 1 P. Wins. 429, 24 Eng. Rep. 458 (Ch. 1718).
37. Id.at 431, 24 Eng. Rep. at 459. In this, as well as in all the English cases cited,
the emphasis is that of the court, unless otherwise noted.
38. 1 Brown C.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 464 (Ch. 1703).
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into a new contract as to the disposition of the property of each in

case of the death of one. The couple then went to England, where
the wife died several years later. Appellants were the wife's next-ofkin, who sued on the original marriage contract; respondent-husband
defended on the ground that the subsequent agreement rendered the
original void.
The noteworthy point about the Foubert case is that neither party
especially wanted the law of France, specifically, the custom of
Paris to be applied in the case. The appellants argued this was
"by no means an attempt to introduce foreign laws or customs as
binding here, any otherwise than by express and positive agreement." 39
Likewise, respondent contended
that the custom of Paris could only affect the parties while they lived there;
and therefore, upon their removing into England, their estates, as to all
such things as were not specifically agreed upon, but 40only left to the custom
of Paris, ought to go according to the laws of England.

Neither party sought to use foreign law; the court did not affirmatively address itself to the question and decided the case on the

basis of the original marriage contract. This would seem a shaky
foundation at best for establishing a "doctrine" that foreign law may

be used at trial only if proved as a fact.41 The subsequent history of

this doctrine in England, however, is even more interesting than the

founding of the doctrine itself.

42
Lord Mansfield was faced with the question, in Mostyn v. Fabrigas,

of whether Governor Mostyn was amenable to suit for false imprisonment on the Island of Minorca. The action was brought in
London, with the question being one of jurisdiction. Yet, by way

of dictum, Lord Mansfield reiterated the "doctrine" of Faubert v.
39. Id. at 131, 1 Eng. Rep. at 465-66.
40. Id. at 132, 1 Eng. Rep. at 466.
41. A very valid question, the answer to which seems to be presumed in all of
these cases, is whether the custom of Paris was indeed "law." If it were not, at least
in the sense which American courts today discuss "foreign law," the very foundation
would have been taken from under the rule that forum courts will not notice foreign
law, as the rule would have been founded on a mistaken hypothesis. The subsequent
discussion of the development of the rule in America highlights the mistaken hypotheses
on which the rule has been based in this country.
42. 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774). "But it is objected, supposing the
defendant to have acted as the Spanish governor was empowered to do before, how
is it to be known here that by the laws and constitution of Spain he was authorized
so to act. The way of knowing foreign laws is, by admitting them to be proved as
facts, and the Court must assist the jury in ascertaining what the law is. For instance,
if there is a French settlement the construction of which depends upon the custom
of Paris, witnesses must be received to explain what the custom is; as evidence is
received of customs in respect of trade. There is a case of the kind I have just
stated."
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Turst.43 It was on such a basis that the common law rule of refusal
to notice foreign law was founded.
b. Applicability of the Foreign Law.-Disregarding, temporarily,

the uncertainty as to how such law was to be produced, the English
courts never questioned the necessity of having foreign law apply

when it was determinative of the matter at hand.
I hold myself not warranted in saying that such a contract is void by the
law of Scotland, because it is void by the law of England. The law of the
country where the contract arose, must govern the contract; and what that
law is, should be given in evidence to me as a fact. 44

This case is also considered authority for the point that the judge
will indulge in no presumption of similarity with respect to this
foreign law. Ostensibly, such a presumption was not a part of the

common law. By this time, the period of wholesale incorporation
of the English common law by the American states had passed; accordingly, the common law doctrine that judicial notice may not be
taken of foreign law had been established on a shaky foundation.
c. Subsequent Development in England.-Keeping this in mind,
the subsequent history of the doctrine of Foubertv. Turst in England
is interesting to trace. Several later cases show precisely how un-

settled this point was at common law. One later case attempted
to prove the existence of a divorce and,
to prove this she produced an instrument under the seal of the synagogue
there, whereby they were divorced from each other. But Lord Kenyon held
this to be no evidence, for before he could take notice of any proceeding in
a foreign Court, he must know the law of the country, which was a matter of
evidence, and should be proved by witnesses. 45

This seems determinative of the question, but several later cases
cast a great doubt on the point. The same Lord Kenyon added to
the confusion in the following manner:
Can the laws of a foreign country be proved by a person who may be
casually picked up in the street? Can a court of justice receive such evidence
of such a matter? I shall expect it to be made out to me, not by such loose
evidence, but by proof from the country, whose laws you propose to give
in evidence, properly authenticated .... Such proof, and so authenticated,

I shall submit, as such only I hold to be legal.46
43. Id. at 174, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1028.

44. Male v. Roberts, 3 Esp. 163, 164-65, 170 Eng. Rep. 574 (C.P. 1800).
45. Ganer v. Lady Lanesborough, 25 Peake 25-26, 170 Eng. Rep. 66 (K.B. 1790).
46. Boehtlinck v. Schneider, 3 Esp. 58, 59-60, 170 Eng. Rep. 537, 538 (C.P. 1799).
(Emphasis added.) The attorney for the plaintiff in this case had "proposed to call
a person conversant with the law of that country, to prove that the law was so. Lord
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A distinction thus emerged as to the treatment of foreign law,
based on whether that law was written or unwritten. Hinted at
earlier, the distinction was expanded in Clegg v. Levy. 47 "The law
being in writing, an authenticated copy of it ought to be produced. 48
At first glance, one might believe that the best evidence rule was
being called into use here. This may be so; yet, such an explanation
does not clarify the reason why Lord Eldon demanded that the law
of the foreign country "should be proved by witnesses" in one case
and in a later case should be "properly authenticated," "not by such
loose evidence" as might be given by witnesses. A logical explanation
of this is that there was no immutable rule in England with respect
to the use of foreign law at trial. If this is so, the experience of such
a rule in America has been based on a faulty assumption.
2. The American Experience.-As late as 1812, the status of the
use of foreign law in a trial in England was uncertain. It was from
this uncertainty that the American experience was drawn. Yet, even
with the law in England so relatively unsettled on this point,
American courts wasted little time in concluding that foreign law
could not be noticed at trial and that foreign law included the laws
of sister states.
While American jurisprudence necessarily developed out of the
common law of England, two points should be noted to indicate the
inappositeness of applying the rule that the forum court would not
judicially notice foreign law, at least when applied to the forum's
sister states. The first point is this unsettled nature of the doctrine
49
in England.
The more important point holds true regardless of what the rule
in England with respect to foreign law was. The American statesby virtue of the compact which they had newly entered into-should
have felt more receptive to the use of the actual foreign law in a
suit in the particular state. England is insular, with one law for the
whole country. Within that country, no political subdivision similar
Kenyon said, he could not admit such evidence of the law of a foreign country." Id.
at 59, 170 Eng. Rep. at 537-38. Buchanan v. Rucker, 1 Camp. 63, 170 Eng. Rep.
877 (K.B. 1807), bearing on this point, held that a foreign judgment could not be
respected when, on its face, it showed that the court was without jurisdiction over the
defendant.
47. 3 Camp. 166, 170 Eng. Rep. 1343 (K.B. 1812).
48. Id. at 167, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1343.
49. The answer given to this contention is extremely intriguing. "That a court will
not take judicial notice of the law of a foreign country is so well established that
in the majority of the cases it is assumed without discussion." 3 BEALE, COFLICT OF
LAws § 621.2, at 1664 (1935). This is, of course, one way of saying that the doctrine
that a forum court would not notice the law of a sister state was founded without a
substantial basis.
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to those in the United States exist; thus, in England itself there is
no concept of "foreign law." Necessarily, all law from outside England
is foreign law. In the United States, on the other hand, such is not
the case. The English experience does not fit, a fortiorari, all
American problems.
a. Applicability of ForeignLaw.-Frank recognition of this fact was
the dual development in this country of providing a "non-foreign
status" to federal and state law when the law of one was involved
in the courts of another. Jealousy of their prerogatives appears to be
the main reason why the American states would not give similar
effect to the law of a sister state.
For, as in England, at no time did the American courts doubt the
conclusive nature of foreign law, where applicable.50 Accordingly, it
has been said that
All the cases agree that, whatever the law of the forum may be, the plaintiffs case must stand, if at all, so far as his right5 of action is concerned,
upon the law of the place where the injury occurred. '

b. Conceptual Basis of Rule.-The very courts maintaining the

applicability of this foreign law nevertheless maintained very strict
rules with respect to the actual use of such law. This introduced the
dichotomy that the law determinative of the case might not really
be law after all, or, at least, might not be the law which would be
applied to determine the case.
The problem is said to have been occasioned by the inability of
the courts to apply a law other than their own-that is, a jurisprudential disability. Thus,
a court neither will nor can apply any law to the case before it other than

the law of the forum. It must necessarily follow that foreign law, in so far
as it is in any way material to the issue, must operate not as law but as fact.
52
This is the fundamental premise underlying the rules ....

c. Factual Development of the Rule.-This explanation makes for

a very neat conceptual theory to excuse forum courts from applying
foreign law. In the law, however, conceptual theories, regardless of
how neat, are quite often not practicalities. In the early American
cases, the courts did not base their reluctance to judicially notice
foreign law on a jurisprudential foundation. The history of the rule
that a forum court may not notice foreign law in Alabama is typical
of this development.
50. Louisiana & No. W. Ry. v. Phelps, 70 Ark. 17, 65 S.W. 709 (1901).
51. Bums v. Grand Rapids & Ind. R.R., 113 Ind. 169, 176, 15 N.E. 230, 233
(1888). (Emphasis added.)
52. 3 BEALE, op. cit. supra § 621.1, at 1664.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 18

An Alabama statute provided that the Secretary of State should
compile a list of interest rates allowable on contracts in other states.
This list was to be bound with the acts of assembly, and
the act makes the table of the rate of interest of the several States prima
facie evidence of the rate to be computed upon contracts, etc.; but this evifrom
dence may be controverted, and it may be shown that a rate 5different
3
that certified to, obtained at the time the contract was made.

This analysis shows that the very matter which one of the parties
sought to have judicially noticed-the list prepared by the Secretary
of State-was not law at all and did not have the nature of law. The
Alabama court reaffirmed its position on this point on numerous
occasions; 54 yet, one such reaffirmation was taken to establish, for the
state of Alabama, the doctrine that its courts would not take judicial
notice of the law of a sister state.55 The Alabama court was simply
saying that the list of interest rates, so published, constituted presumptive evidence of the various state interest rates allowed on
contracts. 56 Yet, on this weak basis, the doctrine has been founded
in the United States.
Unlike Alabama, however, many state courts fell into a trap of
their own making. Such was the case in Connecticut where the court
stated that
All the determinations concur in this, as an established principle, 'that the
way of knowing foreign laws, is, by admitting them to be proved as facts;

and the court must assist the jury in ascertaining what the law is.' . . . In
the United States, this doctrine has often been recognized .... In Hebron
v. Marlborough,2 Conn. Rep. 18, this court adopted the same principle in
respect of the laws of Massachusetts.57
This analysis was first based on the supposed status of the doctrine
in England. More importantly, however, the Connecticut case cited

as controlling is weak authority for the proposition for which it was
cited. The earlier action was one for assumpsit for support of a
bastard born in the State of Connecticut, whose mother had no
settlement in that state. "In this case, the mother had no settlement
in this state. She had one in Taunton in Massachusetts, but it does
not appear that, by the laws of Massachusetts, bastards follow the
settlement of the mother ....58
53. Mobile & Cedar Point R.R. v. Talman, 15 Ala. 472, 493 (1849).
added.)

(Emphasis

54. Clark v. Pratt, 20 Ala. 470, 472 (1852); Harrison v. Harrison, 20 Ala. 629,
649-50 (1852).
55. 9 WIGMORE § 2573, at 555 n.2.
56. "Courts can not take judicial notice of the rates thus published." Insurance
Co. of No. America v. Forcheimer & Co., 86 Ala. 541, 550, 5 So. 870, 875 (1889).
57. Brackett v. Norton, 4 Conn. 517, 520-21 (1823).
58. Hebron v. Marlborough, 2 Conn. 18, 20 (1816).
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The court nowhere explained whether the Massachusetts law was
in evidence or whether it had judicially noticed that bastards do
not follow the settlement of their mother in Massachusetts; it merely
declared what the Massachusetts law "appeared" to be, without
detailing from which source this appearance had come. On this
understanding of the laws of a sister state was the "doctrine" founded
in Connecticut.
Many states established the doctrine on such earlier uncertainties;
some few courts were honest enough to admit that practical difficulties, not theoretical considerations, were what kept them from taking
judicial notice of the law of a foreign state. "A court of this State
cannot go through all the decisions of the Supreme Court of another
State and determine for itself what the law of that State is." 59 Such
practical difficulties should not form the basis for keeping a state
court from judicially noticing, in a proper case, the law of another
state. Yet, when placed on such realistic grounds, the plight facing
the court is easier to understand than when the court attempts to
shield itself in jurisprudential niceties.
As has been intimated earlier, however, the judge should not be
expected to make a search such as the Kentucky court mentioned.
The judge has the right to expect that the party seeking to have
foreign law applied will offer proof on the point. The basic criticism
of the method American courts developed for using foreign law was
the submission of such law to the jury for a factual determination.
C. How Can The Rule Be Changed
At any rate, these courts were soon enunciating that "the laws of
our sister states are facts to be pleaded and proved like other facts.
...We do not take judicial notice of them . ..60 This was an unfortunate and wholly unnecessary step in the development of American law. Several courts recognized the foolishness of such a holding,
but felt helpless to change it. A few states adopted laws allowing their
courts to judicially notice foreign law. A synthesis of these will be
undertaken to see what logically could have been the development of
judicial notice of foreign law in this country.
The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act will then be
examined to see what changes it makes in this situation. Finally,
the status of foreign law at trial in this country at the present time
will be studied. This will necessarily entail a discussion of the
presumption of similarity and the proof of foreign law as a fact.
1. judge or Jury?-Difflculties with language in the communication
59. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Austin's Adm'r, 141 Ky. 722, 728, 133 S.W.
780, 783 (1911).
60. Sammis v. Wrigbtman, 31 Fla. 10, 30, 12 So. 526, 532 (1893).
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of ideas are undoubtedly responsible for many needless problems
today. This is in large part true of the use of foreign law. "Foreign
law is a matter of fact, to be pleaded and proved as such." A
seemingly innocuous statement which is deceptive by virtue of its
simplicity. Where is the emphasis to be put? Is foreign law really a
fact, equivalent in nature to the fact that the Ohio and the Mississippi Rivers join at Cairo, Illinois? If so, must it be proved to the
jury, as the fact that these two rivers come together at a certain point
would have to be? The problems created are haunting, and their solutions have not been easy.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has given the most forthright
answers to these questions; this court's analysis of why foreign law is a
"question of law" has been examined earlier. 61 The reasoning which
prompted this analysis is equally important.
When an issue of fact involves a question of law, the jury are not entrusted
to decide it; but it is the duty of the court to give to the jury instruction in
regard to the law, and it is the duty of the jury to be governed by such in-

structions. In this way, as much accuracy, and as great a degree of fixedness,

in respect to questions of law, is secured, as the nature of the subject admits
of. Such being the case in respect to questions arising about our own laws,
it would seem a matter of course to be likewise so in respect to questions
arising about the laws of other States, or of foreign countries, whenever,

in the62 administration of justice, our Courts are called upon to deal with
them.
The North Carolina court was saying that juries are even more
incompetent to decide questions of foreign law than they are to
decide questions of domestic law with which, after all, they might
be presumed to have some familiarity. The court did not, however,
allow foreign law merely to be introduced at trial. Such foreign law
did have to be proved, and this is as it should be; but, such proof is to
be made to the court, which is the proper body to decide upon the
applicability of law-be it domestic of foreign.
Nothing in this analysis negates the concept of judicial notice as
spelled out earlier, in fact, that earlier concept finds actual support
here. Before judicial notice may be taken of a matter, the court must
make a determination of whether the matter "is so notoriously true
as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute or what is capable
of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to sources of
indisputable accuracy easily accessible to men in the situation of
members of the court."63 There are no valid reasons why these
61. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
62. Hooper v. Moore, supra note 32.
63. Morgan, 57 Hnv. L. REv. at 273. It should be remembered here that this
analysis is very similar to that spelled out earlier in this paper, see text accompanying
notes 8-11 supra, with respect to the "mechanical" aspects of taking judicial notice.
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classifications cannot be applied when a question of foreign law
64
arises.
In this context, the party seeking the use of foreign law would
present to the judge the sources of that law-reported decisions,
statutes, executive orders, and so forth. The party opposing the taking
of judicial notice of the foreign law would have a full opportunity
to show that the law put forward by his opponent was not, in fact,
the law of the foreign state. This proof would be to the court, which
alone would decide whether the foreign law merited the taking of
judicial notice.
If the judge decided this question in the affirmative, he would
instruct the jury as to the nature and effect of that law, precisely as he
now does with domestic law. If the judge decided in the negative,
the party seeking the use of the foreign law would then have to prove
the matter in question to the jury, if he still desired to claim the
benefit of it. Even a refusal by the judge to take such judicial notice
would be of aid to the party seeking the use of foreign law. He
might be convinced that he was, in fact, seeking to have other than
law noticed. More importantly, however, the parties would have a
ruling, as a matter of law, that the foreign matter was not indeed law
-a ruling which, of course, would be reviewable by an appellate
court. Presently, the most they have is the factual determination
by the jury of what the foreign law is.
2. The Necessity of Statutory Change.-This could easily have been
the history of judicial notice of foreign law in this country-a logical
development of the idea of judicial notice applied to what is, in
reality, law in order to give it the same dignity as is given to the
law of the forum. The development was not, however, to be along
these lines. Ideas and concepts were expressed in early cases which
were solidified into an inflexible dogma, in many states, that a court
of the forum could not notice foreign law. Courts were not unaware
of the foolishness of this dogma:
In support of its first assignment appellant has cited Illinois cases as
exemplifying the principles of law which it insists are controlling with
respect thereto, the cause of action having arisen in the state of Illinois.
The law as so interpreted would be controlling if we were cognizant of it.

It was neither pleaded nor proven, and we cannot take judicial notice of it.
This last seems an absurd thing to say when it is considered that the official
reports of the courts of last resort of our sister state are lying here before
us and that we frequently cite cases reported in them as persuasive authority
in support of our own rulings.65
64. While the forum court will not intuitively know the law of a foreign state, it
can immediately and accurately discover that law, given the modem system of legal
research which exists in this country today.
65. Gorman v. St. Louis Merchant's Bridge Terminal Ry., 325 Mo. 326, 332-33,

28 S.W.2d 1023, 1024 (1930).
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a. General Changes.-Yet, as in many areas of the law in which

the courts had themselves made a rule of law absent legislative aid,
and then hesitated to change it without legislative modification, the
courts in this area felt constrained to defer to the various state legislatures to bring about any modification. "But, until the Legislature
sees fit to fully release us from this archiac rule ...

we are supposed

to abide by it."66 Thus, the matter was left, by and large, to statutes
in the individual states.
An exceptionally broad statute is that of Mississippi which has been
law since 1848, and, in the present language since 1906.
When any question shall arise as to the law of the United States, or of any
other state or territory of the United States, or of the District of Columbia,
or of any foreign country, the court shall take notice of such 6law
in the
7
same manner as if the question arose under the law of this state.

This statute contains numerous salutory features: It applies equally
to the law of sister states and foreign countries; it requires no
formalistic proceeding to enable its use, such as pleading, for a
question of foreign law can arise in a number of ways, and it leaves
to the courts the determination of whether what it is faced with is
actually law. This latter determination thus becomes a question of
law reviewable on appeal.
Under such a statute it is not necessary to plead the foreign law
relied on;6 8 nor is the law of the forum at all important-the foreign
law being determinative in fact as well as in theory. If a foreign law is
relied upon in this situation, the forum court is bound by that law
and must dismiss the case if no remedy exists under that law. The
forum court may69not use the remedy, if any, provided by its own
law in such cases.
It should be remembered here that many courts have maintained
this applicability of foreign law while failing to apply it in cases
in which it was admittedly applicable. Even if the inflexible common
law rule existed as claimed, such relatively simple language as that
of the Mississippi statute could be used to free the courts of the
forum to give effect to what all courts, at least in theory, have admitted is the controlling law in such cases.
66. Id. at 333, 28 S.W.2d at 1024.
67. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 1761 (1956).
68. Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395 (1930). Pleading
is not, of course, per se, an evil, but a requirement that foreign law must be pleaded
or else it cannot be used is hypertechnical.
69. Runt v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 88 Miss. 575, 41 So. 1 (1906). "The question is
whether, by the laws of Louisiana, any right of action survives to the natural mother,
or to the administrator of the deceased, or to both. The laws of Mississippi have
no pertinency whatever to the case, since the accident occurred in Louisiana. A right
of action for damages is transitory, of course; but, if there was no right of action
at all by the law of the place, there is nothing to be transitory." Id. at 581, 41 So. at 1.

1965 ]

NOTES

b. The Uniform Act.-Other states have had narrower statutes,
as was the case in Missouri;70 in these states, the courts took a restricted-although, perhaps, not a wholly realistic-view of their
powers under such a statute. This being the case, a Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act was proposed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1936.71 The prefatory
note to the Uniform Act highlighted the dual problem which existed
in most states, that is, the inappositeness of a state in the American
sister state and the foolishness of
Union refusing to know the law of a 72
requiring law to be proved to a jury.
It was generally agreed by this time that this twin common law
rule was outmoded.
Most of the foregoing quiddities are thoroughly unpractical. The judges
manipulate an esoteric logical dream-machine which has caused them to
forget the world of reality. Judicial power should be used to get at the facts
more directly and candidly. The professional common sense, fortunately,
began some time ago to revolt at the needless expenditure of effort involved
in compelling formal proof of what was in most instances virtually indisputable. Particularly absurd was the technical insistence on treating the
States of the Union as foreign to each other....73

The proposed Uniform Act attempted to accomplish in a number of
sections what can easily be accomplished under the relatively simple
language of the Mississippi statute.74 The basic purpose of the pro70. "In every action or proceeding wherein the law of another state of the United
States of America is pleaded, the courts of this state shall take judicial notice of the
public statutes and judicial decisions of said state." 1927 Laws of Missouri 157. It is
to be noted that this statute is no longer in force in Missouri. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
490.070-.120 (1959).
71. UNIFo m JuDicIrAL NoncC, OF FOREIGN LAw AcT §§ 1-9, 9A U.L.A. 318-30
(1957).
72. Id. at 318-19.
73. 9 WiGMoRE § 2573(11), at 558. (Emphasis added.) Even here, Professor
Wigmore indicated his basic feelings about judicial notice. Talking about foreign
law, he yet argues that judicial power must be directed at obtaining the "facts." Such
law is indisputable-"virtually."
74. Uironi JuDIcrAL NoncCE OF FOREIGN LAW AcT §§ 1-9, 9 U.L.A. 320-30 (1957).
"Section 1. Every court of this state shall take judicial notice of the common
law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States.
Section 2. The court may inform itself of such laws in such manner as it may deem
proper, and the court may call upon counsel to aid it in obtaining such information.
Section 3. The determination of such laws shall be made by the court and not by
the jury, and shall be reviewable. Section 4. Any party may also present to the
trial court any admissible evidence of such laws, but, to enable a party to offer evidence
of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof,
reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or
otherwise. Section 5. The law of a jurisdiction other than those referred to in
Section 1 shall be an issue for the court, but shall not be subject to the foregoing
provisions concerning judicial notice. Section 6. This act shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it. Section 7. This act may be cited as the Uniform Judicial Notice
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posed act was to relieve the difficulties the courts had faced in the
past when foreign law was involved in a cause of action. Twenty-eight
jurisdictions in the United States presently subscribe to the Uniform
Act, wholly or in part.75 Well over half of these jurisdictions had
enacted the Act within five years of its proposal, undoubtedly indicative of the desire on the part of many states to eliminate the outmoded
rule that held American states to be foreign to each other.76 Theoretically, as well as practically, such a rule has no place in modern
American jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, the Uniform Act has not proved to be a panacea.
Not all states have adopted it, although some states have their own
rules with respect to judicial notice of foreign law outside of the
Uniform Act.77 Thus, uniformity, at least in form, has not been
achieved. While this is important, more distressing is the fact that
some of the states which have adopted the Uniform Act have done
so with reservation, adding requirements which serve to retain the old
problems. 78 This, of course, does not aid in accomplishing at least
one of the hopes of the Commissioners in proposing the Uniform Act,
namely, making uniform the treatment of foreign law in the various
states.
Even when enacted in its entirety, as recommended, the Uniform
of Foreign Law Act. Section 8. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the
provisions of this act, are hereby repealed. Section 9. This act shall take effect
[_] ."
75. Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
76. In 1937: Indiana, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, and South Dakota; 1939:
Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania; 1940: Rhode Island;
1941: Hawaii, New Jersey, Washington, and Wyoming. These states are listed
alphabetically within the respective years; they are not, therefore, necessarily in
exact chronological order within those years.
77. New York has undoubtedly the most important such provision. N.Y. Civ. PnAC.
LAw § 4571 (New York courts must judicially notice the laws of other states). See
Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, 304 N.Y. 148, 106 N.E.2d 495 (1952) (interpreting the supplanted N.Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 344-a).
78. New Jersey was the first state to require that foreign law be pleaded as a
condition to the court taking judicial notice of it. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-27 (1952).
The statute has since been amended and would appear to place additional restrictions
on the use of foreign law at trial. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-27 (Supp. 1964). Ohio
allows judicial notice to be taken only of statutes. Oimo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.44
(Baldwin 1964). South Carolina also requires that the foreign law must "have
been put in issue by the pleadings" before judicial notice may be taken of it,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-62 (1962). Furthermore, Washington, in adopting the Uniform
Act, changed § 4 to require the party using the foreign law to plead that law as he
would have prior to the adoption of the Uniform Act. WASH. REv. COD. § 5.24.
040 (1963). "Thus in Washington pleading it is now absolutely necessary, not
merely one of several ways of giving notice to the opponent of intent to rely on
foreign law." Comment, 38 WAsH. L. Rlv. 802, 808 (1963).
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Act contains weaknesses which tend to make its application less than
uniform. One particular problem facing the courts has been whether
the foreign law must still be pleaded before judicial notice may be
taken of it. Surprising as it may seem, this problem exists even in
states which have adopted the Uniform Act in its entirety. 9 The
Commissioners, in their prefatory note recommending adoption of the
Uniform Act, commented that
two or three of the sentences or clauses in this Uniform 'Act may seem
needlessly to state the obvious. But they are useful and even necessary for
their educative purpose.... A well-drawn statute may contain some details
which aim to prevent such doubts in advance. Every one of such clauses

in this Act is meant to represent a detail which has been well settled
already, but needs to be mentioned to prevent raising those doubts all over

again.8 0

It is suggested that the past history of judicial notice of foreign
law was indeed well settled on grounds too nebulous to enable such
an attempt to clarify the situation. A proposed statute such as that
in Mississippi-leaving a large discretion for its application with the
court-would appear to offer a preferable attempt to achieve some
measure of uniformity in the use of foreign law. In addition to the
good points previously noted with respect to this statute, one major
feature exists in it which is unfortunately absent in the Uniform Act.
This is that part of the Mississippi act which provides that "the
court shall take notice of such law in the same manner, as if the
question arose under the law of this state."8 ' This "may seem needlessly to state the obvious," but such a provision is extremely important in indicating to a forum court that it need not, with respect
to foreign law, do anything other than it does with respect to its
domestic law. For example, if the forum court of Mississippi would
not take judicial notice of ordinances of towns in Mississippi, 82 under
this statute the court would not be expected to take judicial notice
of such ordinances of a foreign town.
Such a result is only logical in keeping with the attempt to achieve
79. The above comment discusses these problems with the note that the treatment
given them by the courts has not always been consistent with the purpose of making
foreign law more available in the forum court. Id. at 810-16. The "Commissioners'
Notes" to § 4 of the Uniform Act do nothing but add to the confusion as to whether
a forum court should continue to require pleading of the foreign law before it could
be judicially noticed. UNIFoRM JUDICrAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW Acr, 9A U.L.A. 32627 (1957). Of course, the ideal situation might well be for the foreign law to be
pleaded in every case; it is suggested here, however, that to erect a rigid rule that
foreign law must be pleaded in every case before it may be judicially noticed is
definitely not in keeping with the general purpose of the Uniform Act of making
foreign law more accessible in the forum court.
80. 9A U.L.A. 319 (1957).
81. MIss. CODE AN . § 1761 (1956).
82. Naul v. McComb City, 70 Miss. 699, 12 So. 903 (1893).
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uniformity of treatment of law, both domestic and foreign, within the
forum. No party litigant should reasonably expect a court of, the
forum to judicially notice a type of foreign law which the court
would not notice if the law were that of the forum. It is possible
that such a result is implied by the terms of the Uniform Act, but, for
a document purporting to state the obvious for educative purposes,
this seems a decided shortcoming.
D. The Use of ForeignLaw Today
The situation in the United States today with respect to judicial
notice of foreign law is, at best, uncertain. It would be profitable
at this point to examine the ways in which foreign law is used in
those states which have no provision for taking judicial notice of
it or in which, in any particular case, these provisions have not been
complied with. These ways are, of course, proof of such law as a
matter of fact and the presumption of similarity that the foreign law
is the same as that of the forum.
1. Proof of Foreign Law.-Proof of foreign law as a fact is a
requirement which obtains in states which have the Uniform Act
as in those which do not. It is undoubtedly one of the most archaic
rules in American jurisprudence today. Three different situations may
arise with respect to the proof of foreign law as a fact.
a. No ProvisionFor JudicialNotice.-The first situation is the most
complicated and involves a state which has no, or only a limited,
provision for judicially noticing foreign law. In Georgia, the foreign
law relied on must be pleaded and proved completely as a fact.83
In Iowa, on the other hand, the situation is somewhat more confusing.
Iowa has a statute which would appear to sanction the use of judicial
84
notice with respect to foreign law, but this is not entirely clear.
The Iowa Court was faced with a case in which "the decisive question... [was] one of judicial notice." 85 Yet, the court strongly indicated that it might not always apply foreign law, even if it was
decisive. 86 These examples naturally are given to indicate the foolish
results often obtained by rigid adherence to the old common law rule.
b. Rules Other Than The Uniform Act.-The second type of case
is one in which the state has a substantial rule providing for the
83. Record Truck Line v. Harrison, 109 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E.2d 65 (1964).
84. "Matters of which judicial notice is taken need not be stated in any pleading.
But a pleading asserting any statute, or a right derived therefrom, shall refer to such
statute by plain designation. The court shall judicially notice the statutes of any
state, territory or other jurisdiction of the United States so referred to." IowA R. Civ.
PRoc. 94 (1943). This rule is not directed at the taking of judicial notice of foreign
law, but it would appear that this result can be accomplished under it.
85. In re Estate of Drumheller, 252 Iowa 1378, 1380, 110 N.W.2d 833-34 (1961).
86. Id. at 1385, 110 N.W.2d at 837.
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taking of judicial notice of foreign law other than the Uniform Act.
New Mexico is such a state, and its provision "is almost identical in
language and clearly has the same intent and meaning as the Uni-

form Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act." 7 The interpretation

placed upon this rule appears to be one which also requires pleading,
and perhaps proof, of the foreign law which a party may seek to use.88
The New York Court of Appeals has construed its statute as being
"permissive, not mandatory." 89
c. Under The Uniform Act.-The harshest result with respect to
proving foreign law, however, has been obtained in a state which does
have the Uniform Act. Shortly after the adoption of the Uniform
Act in Florida, that state's supreme court placed a very strict construction on its use. "Under the provisions of the Uniform Act, a
matter pertaining to foreign law may become a question of law to be
determined by the court. However, the act does not operate automatically in every case."90 The court then proceeded to detail, rather
sharply, the procedure which must be followed in using the Uniform
Act in Florida.'
Since that time, the Florida courts have not become any more
lenient in their interpretation of the Uniform Act. In fact, it is arguable whether the act in Florida has not been eliminated by judicial
erosion. "If the law of a foreign state is to be relied upon as governing a given transaction it must be pleaded and proved as any other
issue of fact, for the local courts will not take judicial notice of it."92
What constructive effect the Uniform Act can have in a state after
such an interpretation is highly debatable.
2. The Presumptionof Similarity.-Such questions have a tendency
to blur into the presumption of similarity, so that sharp distinctions
between the two are difficult to draw. In states which do not have
the Uniform Act, so that foreign law must be pleaded and proved,
"where the law of a sister state is not pleaded, this court will presume
law, as interpreted by the
that the law of such states is the common
93
decisions of the courts of this state."

The holding is the same when the state has adopted the Uniform
Act, but one of the procedural requirements under it has not been
87. Boswell v. Rio De Oro Uranium Mines, 68 N.M. 457, 460-61, 362 P.2d 991,

994 (1959).
88. Id. at 461, 362 P.2d at 994.
89. Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, supra note 77, at 149, 106 N.E.2d at 496.
90. Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So. 2d 455-56 (Fla. 1955).
91. Ibid.
92. This being true, the appellate court may not take judicial notice of the foreign
law when it is first raised before that court. Miller v. Shulman, 122 So. 2d 589-90
(Fla. D. Ct. App. 1960).
93. Greenfield v. Chronicle Printing Co., 107 Ga. App. 442, 130 S.E.2d 526-27
(1963).
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carried out. "Plaintiff has not brought to our attention any statutory
or decisional law of Connecticut . .

.

. We presume, therefore, that

the parties are content to have New Jersey law apply."9 There is
some lack of clarity as to precisely what law the forum court will
apply in such a case, but this can be clarified by determining whether
the state involved was one of the original thirteen colonies.
If the state were one of these, its courts talk in terms of presuming
with respect to the common law.
If no statute of the foreign State is pleaded the common law as interpreted
by the courts of this State determines the rights of the respective parties....
The common law as applied by the courts of this State is the common law
and statutes of England that were of force May 14, 1776.95

If the state were not one of the original colonies, it merely talks
in terms of presuming with respect to the state's law.
We need spend no time on whether the case is governed by Iowa or Oklahoma law. The trial court concluded that in the absence of pleading and
proof of Oklahoma law it is presumed to be the same as Iowa's (the forum)
and therefore our law governs the case. This accords with our decisions ....96

Of course, the only real difference is the manner in which the forum
court words its manner of presuming; it is basically presuming that

the law of the foreign state is the same as its law.
3. The Remaining Hope.-It will be re-iterated here that confusion
is the keynote with respect to the use of foreign law in the forum
state in America today. This situation fortunately is not hopeless.
The Arizona Supreme Court shed the most recent ray of hope in this
area and did so in a quite remarkable manner.97 It flatly decided
that the common law rule with respect to judicial notice of foreign
law was anachronistic and rejected it.
The entire tenor of the decision by the Arizona court is so refreshing that no part of the opinion will be specifically quoted. In this
very well-reasoned, well-written opinion, the Arizona court made
three observations: (1) that in the past foreign law had been a
matter of pleading and proof in Arizona, (2) that the basis of the
rule in England was inapposite for use in America today, where no
realistic view of the United States can really treat the states as foreign
to one another, and (3) that, since this was a rule judicially created,
98
the courts need not wait for the legislature to change it.
The Nevada Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion several
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

MacKay v. Avison, 82 N.J. Super. 92, 99, 196 A.2d 691, 695 (App. Div. 1964).
Record Truck Line v. Harrison, supra note 83, at 658, 137 S.E.2d at 69.
Reed v. Bunger, 255 Iowa 322, 329, 122 N.W.2d 290, 295 (1963).
Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America v. O'Grady, 97 Ariz. 9, 396 P.2d 246 (1964).
Id. at 11, 396 P.2d at 248-49.
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years prior to the Arizona court.99 To say that such decisions are
refreshing is an understatement. These courts were accomplishing
the highest purpose of our judicial system-reaching an adjustment
of the legal relations between parties and doing so by recognizing
the practical facts of modern legal life. In so doing, these courts were
showing a courage often lacking in state courts today. When a court
is faced with a judicially created doctrine which has fossilized into
an untenable rule, it is only shirking its duty when it defers to the
legislature for the necessary change.
Unfortunately, such unwarranted deference, until very recently,
has been the cause of a highly unrealistic judicial attitude with
respect to the use of foreign law in forum courts. If, in coming years
state legislatures do not take steps to simplify the necessary procedure
before their courts can take judicial notice of foreign law, it is to be
hoped that more courts demonstrate courage similar to that of the
Arizona and Nevada courts. Those states which are subscribers to the
Uniform Act, being bound by statute, will likely be the last to reach
such a salutory result.
When the problems exist under the framework of a statute, judicial
"change" is more difficult to obtain. However, it can be hoped that
courts will begin, in the states which do have the Uniform Act, to
place a less restrictive interpretation on that statute. The restrictive
amendments and interpretations given the Uniform Act have not
advanced the purpose it sought to achieve.
IV. CONCLUSION

By virtue of reliance on uncertain precedents and mistaken
hypotheses, American courts found themselves on the horns of a
dilemma with respect to the use of foreign law at trial. On the one
hand, these courts staunchly maintained the conclusiveness of such
foreign law when applicable with respect to a cause of action
brought in the forum.
These same courts, however, erected a wall designed to prevent the
actual application of this admittedly applicable foreign law. Alternately, and at times cumulatively, these courts relied on the common
law of England, jurisprudential theories as to the lack of effect of a
state's laws beyond its boundaries, and, less frequently, the practical
difficulties involved in asking that the foreign law be searched out
by the forum court.
All of this succeeded to a very great extent in keeping the foreign
law from being applied and, even less satisfactorily, in having the
law of the forum applied.
99. Choate v. Ransom, 74 Nev. 100, 323 P.2d 700 (1958).
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The courts admitted their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs.
Yet, they were unwilling to change a rule of their own creation
and preferred to defer to the legislatures to bring about the needed
change. This, however, is where the courts for the most part met
their greatest failing. When the legislatures responded by permitting
the court of the forum to judicially know foreign law, the court, more
often than not, very narrowly construed its power under such permission.
To say that this is unrealistic is of no avail, the courts of this
country were simply not facing reality when they insisted that the
law of their sister states was a matter of fact which had to be
pleaded and proved whenever a party to a lawsuit wished to rely
on such law, which all courts admitted was applicable law.
The supreme courts of Arizona and Nevada have recently demonstrated the proper function of a court in such a situation. It can only
be hoped that more courts will be convinced that such is the proper
step for them to take in the future.
JEROME J. KIASA

